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Abstract 
Counterfactuals, or mental simulations of alternative realities (e.g., “If I invite him to the 
wedding, then we will have to spend a lot of time together”), greatly influence judgment and 
decision making.  In the current research, the certainty with which people held their 
counterfactuals was manipulated.  Three potential explanations for the results of this research 
will be proposed.  One possibility is that when people are certain of their counterfactual-relevant 
thoughts, they will serve to impact their behavior more.  Another possibility is that doubt will 
increase the apparent impact of counterfactuals over certainty, either because doubt primes make 
the potential negative outcomes seem more negative, thereby increasing motivation to avoid 
them, or because certainty primes make people feel less worried about the negative outcomes 
because they have gained a sense of self-assurance from the certainty prime.  To test these 
hypotheses, students were told to consider a hypothetical situation, generate relevant 
counterfactuals about one of two possible behavioral choices, and then were primed with either 
certainty or doubt.  Finally, they were asked to choose between the two possible behaviors.  
Ultimately, the results were consistent with the second and third hypotheses: doubt was 
associated with greater impact of counterfactual-generation on behavior.  This research 
contributes to the literature on counterfactuals by examining a novel hypothesis and suggesting 
mechanisms by which counterfactuals can be more or less impactful on subsequent choice. 
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Introduction 
People often simulate possible outcomes of various decisions they could make in a given 
situation by generating likely consequences of each possible choice (Roese, 1997). Then, the 
decision with the best potential outcome is selected.  To illustrate, a woman debating whether or 
not to go to a wedding with an acquaintance might try to imagine all the possible implications 
before coming to the final decision that would most benefit her.  For example, she may think, “If 
I go with him to this wedding, then we might become romantically interested in one another and 
that is a somewhat frightening idea.  But if I don’t go to this wedding, then I probably won’t 
have fun next weekend.”  Similarly, people also spontaneously generate alternative scenarios for 
outcomes that they have already experienced (Roese, 1997).  For example, after choosing to not 
invite an acquaintance to a wedding, a woman might think: “If only I had invited him, then I 
would have had someone to dance with during those slow songs.”  These sorts of thoughts can 
influence how people feel about the outcomes they have experienced and also influence future 
behavior in similar situations.   
Counterfactuals 
Both of the mental simulations about alternative realities discussed above are 
counterfactuals.  Counterfactuals are a way of simulating past, present or future events by 
generating ideas about “what might have been” or “what may be.”  Thus, counterfactuals are 
simply “if…, then…” statements in which people make inferences about the ways in which 
factors of a situation could change that would in turn have changed the outcomes of that situation 
(Kahneman & Miller, 1986).  
Research has shown that counterfactuals are included in mental simulation about future 
decisions: people generate counterfactuals in order to figure out how they will feel about the 
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outcomes of different decisions they can make.  They then use those counterfactuals to decide 
which decision will result in less regret, should the outcome be negative (Hetts, Boninger, 
Armor, Gleicher, & Nathanson, 2000; Roese, 1994).  In addition, counterfactuals can influence 
how people feel about their present situations, including judgments of life meaningfulness (Kray, 
George, Liljenquist, Galinsky, Tetlock, & Roese, 2010) and performance satisfaction (Medvec, 
Madey, & Gilovich, 1995).  Counterfactuals can even determine how people make judgments 
about the consequences of other peoples’ circumstances based on the corresponding decisions 
that they made. Examples of these thoughts include judgments about who is to blame for a 
negative occurrence (Branscombe, Owen, Garstka, & Coleman, 1996; Petrocelli, Percy, Sherman 
& Tormala, 2011).   
Heretofore, researchers have focused on comparing different counterfactuals to one 
another (i.e., focus on undoing this or that aspect of the situation) or comparing the generation of 
counterfactuals to a control.  These researchers have continually demonstrated how important 
counterfactuals are for evaluations of the self (Medvec et al., 1999), judgments of others 
(Branscombe et al. 2009, and Kray et al., 2010) and for future decisions (Hetts et al., 2000).  
However, researchers are only now beginning to focus on whether inferences about the 
counterfactuals themselves can increase or decrease their influence.   
Factors Influencing the Impact of Counterfactuals 
Very few factors have been tested with regard to whether or not they moderate the impact 
of counterfactuals on judgment or behavior. One of the inferences about counterfactuals that has 
been studied is “counterfactual potency”, or the likelihood that some antecedent (“if…”, also 
called the “if likelihood”) occurs with some outcome (“then…”, or the “then likelihood”).  
Petrocelli and colleagues (2011) have shown that “counterfactual potency” influences the impact 
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of the counterfactual (or the influence behind the counterfactual thought).  In this research, 
participants were given a scenario, asked to generate counterfactuals, estimate the likelihoods 
associated with the antecedent (i.e., “if…” part of the counterfactual) and outcome (i.e., “then…” 
part of the counterfactual), and then make judgments of blame or responsibility.  When people 
thought that the counterfactuals they generated were unlikely to happen, their judgments of 
blame or responsibility were reduced relative to when people thought that the counterfactuals 
they generated were likely. 
Other research involves the ease of the counterfactual generation (Petrocelli & Dowd, 
2009). In these studies, the researchers showed that when counterfactuals are difficult to generate 
(researchers did this by constructing scenarios that either fostered counterfactual thinking or that 
did not), the impact of the counterfactuals on related judgments were reduced compared to when 
counterfactual generation was easy.  This effect was observed among people high in the need for 
cognition, an individual difference in people’s propensity to engage in effortful thought 
(Cacioppo & Petty, 1982).  People high in the need for cognition are more influenced by 
metacognition, or thoughts about their thoughts, like perceptions of ease (e.g., Tormala, Petty, & 
Briñol, 2002).  This is consistent with the idea that the difficulty or ease of generation influenced 
metacognitions. 
Counterfactual Certainty 
Thus, previous research shows that people do make inferences about both the likelihood 
of (Petrocelli et al., 2011) and the ease of generating their counterfactuals (Petrocelli & Dowd, 
2009), and that these inferences can affect the impact of the counterfactual on judgment, 
particularly among people who are predisposed to pay attention to their own thoughts (Petrocelli 
& Dowd, 2009).  However, this research did not examine perhaps one of the most important 
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metacognitions (i.e., thoughts about thoughts) people can have: certainty.  Certainty refers to 
how much trust or confidence people have in the validity of their their thoughts (Briñol & Petty, 
2009).  Ease of thought generation is one of many metacognitions that increase certainty 
(Tormala et al., 2007), so existing research on metacognitions that influence the impact of 
counterfactuals (e.g., Petrocelli et al., 2011; Petrocelli & Dowd, 2009) indirectly supports the 
possibility that certainty might also play a role in the influence of counterfactuals on judgment.  
However, people can be certain for many reasons in addition to ease, and ease can impact 
judgments for reasons other than certainty (Schwarz et al, 1991), so it is important to examine 
certainty on its own. 
Self-validation of counterfactuals.  Research on persuasion has shown that the thoughts 
people generate to persuasive messages are used more when people are certain of them (e.g., 
Petty et al., 2002; Briñol, Petty, & Tormala, 2004).  To illustrate, Petty and colleagues (2002) 
found that when participants generated positive thoughts in response to a message or 
advertisement, increasing confidence in those thoughts increased the persuasiveness of the 
message or advertisement.  However, when participants generated negative thoughts in response 
to a message or advertisement, increasing confidence in those negative thoughts decreased the 
persuasiveness of the message or advertisement.  
 The current research examines a self-validation approach to counterfactual impact. 
Counterfactuals are thoughts of a sort that people generate about the situations they encounter, so 
it seems likely that people can have thoughts about these counterfactual thoughts.  Indeed, some 
of the prior research (Petrocelli & Dowd, 2009; Petrocelli et al., 2011) indicates that people do in 
fact make inferences about their counterfactual thoughts (e.g., ease and potency).  As a result, 
manipulations that have previously shown to influence thought certainty might also work to 
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influence the certainty people have in their counterfactuals.  If so, this difference in certainty 
could in turn produce differential impacts on decisions or judgments, such that people who are 
certain should use their counterfactuals more than people who are uncertain.   
To test this idea, in the current research participants considered a counterfactual to a 
negative event that also resulted in a negative outcome.  Following this, they were made to feel 
confidence or doubt.  If the confidence or doubt generalizes to the thoughts about the 
counterfactual, then people should be more influenced by it.  Thus, if people become more 
confident in thoughts about why they would regret having taken some action, they should be less 
likely to choose this action than if they had doubt in these thoughts. 
Alternatives to Self-Validation 
Although the self-validation hypothesis is the most straightforward prediction (i.e., 
increased certainty increasing counterfactual impact), two other possible effects of increasing the 
certainty in negative counterfactuals were considered.  These are described next. 
Bleeding Effect.  In contrast to the self-validation hypothesis, it could also be the case 
that increasing feelings of doubt could cause the impact of the negative emotions associated with 
generating counterfactuals about negative events to increase, thus causing a larger effect of 
counterfactuals among people primed with doubt than among people primed with certainty.  A 
considerable amount of research has been done to show that mood states influence cognition and 
judgments (for a review see Wyer, Clore, & Isbell, 1999).  For example, Mayer, Gaschke, 
Braverman, & Evans, 1992, conducted a study which highlighted the effects of mood on 
judgment and found that those people who were primed with positive moods such as happiness 
were more likely to determine that the outcome of a given question as positive because they were 
subconsciously pulled to a positive valence by their moods. In contrast, those primed with 
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negative moods (such as guilt, fear, or sadness) were more likely to judge the outcome of a given 
question as negative.   
According to this view, if the outcomes being considered in a counterfactual scenario are 
negative, it could be the case that manipulations that make people feel doubtful increases the 
impact of those counterfactuals.  For instance, if the woman in the wedding situation described 
earlier is considering inviting a particular acquaintance, Sam, to a wedding and formulates a 
negative counterfactual about the possible experience: “If I invite him to come with me, then he 
will probably drink too much.” After thinking this, if she is further reminded of another 
unpleasant time in her life where she had to deal with someone’s intoxicated behavior (or any 
other negative event, for that matter), the negative feelings stemming from the memory further 
exacerbate the negative counterfactual she had made about Sam.  In turn, this would make her 
even less likely to invite him.   
Thus, in the current research, rather than doubt attenuating confidence in thoughts about 
some action not taken, the doubt would magnify the overall feeling of regret about not taking 
some action.  This means that doubt would increase choice of that action rather than reduce it. It 
is also interesting to note that if this mechanism occurs, one would expect to find the opposite 
result for outcomes that are positive rather than negative.  That is, if a person is considering a 
negative counterfactual and experiences positive affect, the resulting positive emotion may serve 
to counter the negativity of the counterfactual (i.e., reducing the feeling of regret), making it less 
impactful. 
General Self-Confidence.  A third possibility involves the effects that confidence has on 
decision making.  Confident people are more certain of their decisions (Petty et al., 2002) and 
more optimistic (Briñol, Petty & Tormala, 2006; for review, Taylor & Brown, 1988).  Similarly, 
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high self –esteem goes hand-in-hand with overall confidence an individual maintains in life 
(Cohen, 1959).  In one study, participants who were designated as falling under high self-esteem 
(after completing a questionnaire) expected high success rates on tasks at a level consistent with 
their high self-esteem. Conversely, those categorized under low self-esteem expected lower 
success rates (McFarlin & Blascovich, 1981).  These results further the notion that confident 
people are generally more confident in their decisions and actions. 
Thus, it is possible that inducing people to feel certain may make them feel more 
confident in themselves overall rather than their particular thoughts or attitudes (see e.g., Loersch 
& Payne, 2011).  Because people who are generally self-confident are more certain of their 
decisions and are generally more optimistic, they may be resistant to counterfactuals suggesting 
an otherwise negative outcome. These people discount the likelihood or the extremity of a 
potential negative outcome because they generally trust their decisions.  Thus, if people feel self-
confident, then they would not regret their decisions regardless of the outcome because of a 
belief that their choices are generally correct.  If this mechanism were operating, those primed 
with confidence would not show an impact of the counterfactual scenario as much as those 
primed with doubt who would regret their prior decision or believe it was wrong, consistent with 
their low self-confidence.  
Present Study 
The purpose of the current research was to examine the impact of confidence on 
counterfactual judgments.  The research aimed to see whether confidence or doubt following 
counterfactual thinking would increase the impact of the counterfactual (consistent with the self-
validation mechanism) or whether it would reduce it (consistent with the bleeding effect and self-
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confidence possibilities). Of importance, the research design used does not allow for 
distinguishing between the latter two hypotheses.  
The present study examined the effects of a manipulation of certainty (Petty, Briñol, & 
Tormala, 2002) on a decision made about counterfactual scenarios. Following Hetts and 
colleagues (2000), participants were asked to imagine that they were on their way from the 
parking lot to a quiz in their next class when, halfway there, they forgot whether or not they 
locked their car. Half of the participants were then asked to think about how upset they would be 
had they gone straight to the quiz without going back to check their car and their car 
consequently got broken into (car regret condition), while the other half were asked to think 
about how upset they would be if they walked back to check their car, found out it was locked all 
along, and consequently missed their quiz (quiz regret condition).  Both of these are upsetting 
events that would elicit negative thoughts.  Participants then described a time in which they felt 
either “confident” or “doubtful” as part of an “unrelated study” (Petty et al., 2002).  Finally 
participants were asked what they would do in the hypothetical situation. 
To review, there are three potential outcomes for this experiment.  From a self-validation 
perspective, one would expect to find that counterfactuals have more impact when they are held 
with certainty.  This is because the negative thoughts elicited by the counterfactual scenario, if 
held with certainty, would be used more to affect choices than if these thoughts were held with 
doubt.  For example, if participants were thinking about how upset they would be if they failed to 
walk back to the car and found out later that it was burglarized (car regret), they should be more 
likely to say they would walk back to the car rather than go to the quiz if made to feel certainty 
rather than doubt following thinking.   From a bleeding-effect perspective, one would expect to 
find that counterfactuals involving undoing negative outcomes (like the scenario chosen for this 
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experiment) have more impact when they are preceded by a doubt prime, because the doubt 
prime would magnify the regret at the action not taken.  Finally from a self-confidence 
perspective, one would expect people primed with confidence to show a lesser impact of 
counterfactual thinking than those primed with doubt because the confidence would make them 
dismiss changing from whatever course of action they thought of first. 
Method 
Participants and Design 
Eighty-five introductory psychology students participated in exchange for course credit.   
Participants were assigned to the cells of a 2 (Counterfactual Direction: Car Regret or Quiz 
Regret) ×2 (Prime: Confidence or Doubt) between-participants design.   
Procedure 
Students participated in a computer lab in small groups of no more than 11.  They were 
told that their participation involved performing several unrelated tasks.   
First, participants took part in the regret scenario portion of the experiment, following 
Hetts and colleagues (Hetts et al., 2000). Participants were asked to imagine that they commuted 
to school and were on their way from a parking lot on campus to a class in which they had an 
important quiz. Further, they were asked to imagine that they were in a bit of a rush to make it in 
time for the quiz, and on the way to class they got a strange feeling that they may not have 
locked their car (see Appendix A).  Then participants were asked to think about and list their 
thoughts on about one version of the scenario.  Following the thought listing was the 
manipulation of confidence presented as part of an unrelated study.  Then participants were 
asked whether or not they would go straight to class for the quiz, or go back to check on their 
car. Finally, participants were thanked for their participation, debriefed, and dismissed. 
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Independent Variables 
Regret. Participants in the car regret condition were asked to think for a minute about 
how upset they would be if they did not go back to check their car and as a consequence, their 
car was burglarized (see Appendix B), while participants in the quiz regret condition were asked 
to think about how upset they would be if they went back to check their car, found out if had 
been locked the entire time and ended up missing the quiz (see Appendix C).  
Certainty. The participants in the confident prime condition were told to think about and 
describe two instances in which they felt confident, and the participants in the doubt prime 
condition were told to think about and describe two instances in which they felt doubtful (Petty 
et al., 2002) (see Appendix D).
1
 
 
Dependent Variable: Decision 
To assess the decision the participants make regarding the regret scenarios, participants 
were asked to choose one answer from a scaled-reposing question asking if they would either: a. 
definitely go back to check the car, b. probably go back to check the car, c. probably go straight 
to the quiz, or d. definitely go straight to class for the quiz. The final decision made by the 
participants was scored on a scale of 1 to 4; a score of 1 meaning that they would go directly 
back to check their car and a score of 4 signifying that they would go directly to class for the 
quiz (see Appendix E). 
Results 
 Replicating prior research, there was a main effect of counterfactual condition on choices, 
F(1,81) = 7.43, p < 0.01, such that people were more likely to choose to return to their car when 
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they were in the car regret condition (M = 2.31, SD = 1.093) than in the quiz regret condition (M 
= 2.86, SD = 0.889).  The main effect of validation condition was not significant (F < 1). 
This main effect was qualified by a significant interaction between the validation 
manipulation and counterfactual condition, F (1,81) = 4.11, p = 0.05 (see Figure 11).  Simple 
effects analysis revealed that the effect of the counterfactual condition was significant among 
participants primed with doubt, F(1,81) = 10.68, p < 0.01, but not among participants primed 
with confidence, F (1,81) = 0.26, ns.    
 
Figure 1: Results of self-validation effects on counterfactuals.  Higher numbers indicate greater likelihood of going 
to the quiz rather than the car. 
 
Discussion 
The results of the study on which the materials for this study were based (Hetts et al., 
2004) were replicated.  Furthermore, an interaction between the confidence/doubt prime and 
counterfactual scenario showed that counterfactual thinking had a greater impact when doubt 
rather than confidence was activated. Thus, the results from this study instead are consistent both 
with the bleeding-effect perspective and the general self-confidence perspective rather than the 
self-validation hypothesis.   
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Specifically, regarding the “bleeding effect” in the context of our experiment, this would 
mean that those participants primed with doubt (a negative valence mood condition) may have 
felt even more regretful about whichever choice they failed to make (quiz or car).  This extra 
negative emotion may have caused them to be assume that the worst would occur, meaning they 
would have judged the salient negative outcome as more likely or the more negative against any 
other alternative.  As a result, these participants would have been more likely to choose the 
option that would prevent the inevitable feeling of doom exacerbated by the doubt prime.  Thus, 
when people thought about missing a quiz, the doubt made them more motivated to avoid 
missing it than confidence did.  When people thought about the car being burglarized, they were 
more motivated to go back and check on the car.   
On the other hand, those primed with confidence (a positive valence mood condition) 
would have simply judged either of the two negative outcomes as unlikely to occur or less 
negative (i.e., regret their choice less), and consequently they would have been less likely to 
choose to remedy the negative consequences than those primed with the doubt condition.  This is 
consistent with research on mood showing that moods can affect decisions in this manner (Mayer 
et al., 1992). 
Interestingly, would expect different effects with counterfactual thinking involving 
positive outcomes.  In these cases, a confidence prime might make the positive outcomes seem 
more likely or more positive, which would result in greater impact of counterfactuals in the 
confidence condition relative to the doubt condition.  One might also expect that mood might 
mediate these effects, such that the relative impact of counterfactuals depends upon the success 
of the prime to produce a positive or negative mood.  Future research could address these issues.   
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These data also were consistent with the self-confidence perspective, which would mean 
that participants in our experiment primed with confidence may have felt a quasi-sense of 
assurance about their hypothetical predicament, rendering the counterfactual condition irrelevant. 
For example, a participant posed with the hypothetical situation would automatically make a 
decision or a judgment as to how he or she would handle the situation (either weighing the car 
more important than the quiz or vice versa).   This initial automatic decision, or “gut decision,” 
should have stayed with the self-confident participant even after the counterfactual condition was 
applied.  Then, once they were primed with confidence, the amount of confidence and certainty 
gained from the prime would have gathered toward the initial “gut” decision that they had made.  
After all, self-confident people should generally be correct in their decisions and thus they would 
stick with their initial tendency.  If approximately half of the participants’ initial thought was to 
go back to the car and the other half of the participants were leaning towards going on to the 
quiz, then, the results would have shown no main effect of counterfactuals in the confidence 
condition, which was indeed what the results of this experiment were.  On the heels of this 
hypothesis, those primed with doubt would then feel less confident in the potential positive 
outcomes and would thusly choose to act on whichever negative consequence they were asked to 
consider (Mayer et al., 1992; Wyer et al., 1999).   
Unlike the “bleeding” mechanism, the self-confidence mechanism would not be 
influenced by the valence of the outcome; the tendency to stay with one course of action would 
remain the same.  However, the effect might be moderated by the target of the counterfactual 
(e.g., self versus other).  General self-confidence relevant for making judgments about self, 
though not for judgments about others.  Thus, if second guessing the action that a friend took 
rather than the self, self-confidence should not moderate the results.  In addition, if the 
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mechanism is self-confidence, one might expect to find that self-confidence ratings after the 
primes would mediate the effect of the prime on the judgments.  One might also expect that if the 
“gut reactions” were assessed, the effect of the earlier gut reactions would be stronger for those 
that were primed with confidence relative to doubt.  Future research will examine all of these 
possibilities.   
It is also important to point out that the type of paradigm used was in fact a hypothetical 
one.  In future research, it may be consequential to transition the simulated situation to a “real-
life” instance that the participants had experienced for themselves to see if the results could 
possibly differ.   
Implications 
The results of the current research imply that there is potentially an important role for the 
confidence or doubt people feel following counterfactual thinking.  Our thoughts and ways of 
counterfactual thinking are usually the cause for the subsequent emotions that we feel.  Because 
humans are emotional creatures, happiness is ultimately the goal in everyone’s lives, whether it 
is for themselves or for others.   
Because these emotions stem from counterfactual thinking, and if counterfactual thinking 
can be manipulated, then so can emotions and possibly general perspective on life. This 
application could be used in certain cognitive therapies where recognizing and reducing or 
emphasizing certain counterfactual thoughts is the main course of action.  Validating positive 
counterfactual thoughts could cause “happy” emotions to become more pronounced and perhaps 
amplified, while invalidating negative thoughts could cause depressing emotions to pack less of a 
punch.  With this in mind, more efficacious means of treatment could be assumed.  
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Conclusions 
To conclude, this experiment was a first step in examining how feelings of confidence or 
doubt can impact the outcome of counterfactual thinking. Though the precise mechanism 
through which certainty affects counterfactuals is for now unclear, the results of this one study 
indicate that certainty is indeed an important factor to take into consideration when 
understanding the impact of counterfactuals. 
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Appendix A: Scenario 
 
  Imagine that you commute to school and that you park 
your car in one of the lots on campus. Further imagine that, on 
this day, you are walking to class in a bit of a rush because you 
have a quiz that you do not want to be late for. On the way to 
class, however, you get a strange feeling that you may have left 
your car door unlocked. Try as you might, you cannot be 
absolutely certain whether or not you locked your door. 
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Appendix B: Car Regret Condition 
 
Think for a minute about how upset you would be if you didn’t 
go back to check your car, and later that day your car was 
burglarized.  We would like you to write about your feelings and 
thoughts in the boxes below, pressing enter after each one.  
Don’t worry about spelling or grammar, just type your thoughts 
and feelings as they come to you. 
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Appendix C: Quiz Regret Condition 
 
Think for a minute about how upset you would be if you went 
back to check your car, found out that it was locked all along, 
and ended up missing your quiz. We would like you to write 
about your feelings and thoughts in the boxes below, pressing 
enter after each one.  Don’t worry about spelling or grammar, 
just type your thoughts and feelings as they come to you. 
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 Appendix D: Certainty Description 
 
Before you continue to the next part of the experiment, we'd like 
you to switch gears for several minutes and write about your 
personal experiences.  Using the box on the next page, we would 
like you to recall two particular incidents in which you felt very 
certain.  By certain, we mean a situation in which felt confident 
or sure.  Please describe this situation in which you felt certainty 
-- what happened, how you felt, etc. 
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Appendix E: Certainty Prime Task 
 
With vividness and detail, describe TWO situations in which 
you FELT CONFIDENT: 
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Appendix F: Doubt Prime Task 
 
With vividness and detail, describe TWO situations in which 
you FELT DOUBTFUL: 
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Appendix G: Decision (Dependent Variable) 
 
  Would you either: 
  a.       Definitely go back to check your car, or 
  b.       Probably go back to check your car, or 
  c.        Probably go straight to class for the quiz 
  d.       Definitely go straight to class for the quiz
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1
 Participants in the doubt prime condition received the same initial instructions as participants in 
the ertainty prime condition, due to a programming error.  However, on the screen on which 
participants entered their situations, the doubt prime instructions were accurate.  In addition, 
participants in the doubt prime condition did in fact write about times in which they felt doubtful.  
The mixup could have added to the general feeling of doubt participants had. 
